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The constitution and democracy in troubled times 
Does textualism and 
originalism approach positively 
impact democracy? 
Many judges, including a ma-jority of the justices who presently serve on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, would agree with 
the following statement: Judges 
should interpret the Constitution ac-
cording to its text, as that text was 
originally understood when it be-
crune law, even if that interpretation 
conflicts with one that might better 
serve the public interest. 
They argue that this "textualist-
originalist" approach is required to 
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justify our practice of judicial review. 
Judicial review, commonly traced to 
the Supreme Court's 1803 decision 
in Marbury v. Madison, is our com-
mitment to giving final say about 
what the Constitution means to the 
judicial branch. 
Why, according to textualist-orig-
inalists, mustjudges confine them-
selves to discovering the original 
meaning of constitutional text, · 
rather than, say, construing it to 
reach a more socially useful result? 
In a word, democracy. Judicial re-
view can only be tolerated in a 
democracy, they argue, if judges 
serve as interpreters rather law-
makers when it comes to defining 
the Constitution. All other ap-
proaches inevitably involve a life-
tenured elite imposing their moral 
and policy preferences on the rest of 
us. And that is anti-democratic. 
There is a powerful logic to this 
argument. But what if we think of 
the relationship between our Consti-
tution and democracy in different 
terms? What if, instead of prioritiz-
ing the theoretical, pro-democracy 
benefits of textualism and original-
ism, we ask whether the policy out-
comes these modes of analysis pro-
duce positively impact our democ-
racy in fact? 
Refraining the analysis in this 
way raises questions about whether 
a strict textualist-originalist ap-
proach to constitutional interpreta-
SEE CONSTITUTION C3 
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CONSTITUTION FROM Cl Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (2010) , 
tion actually advances demo- a 5-4 decision holding that po-
cratic values. For the textual- litical spending is a form of 
ism and originalism practiced protected speech under the 
by many of our justices and First Amendment, and that 
judges has led them to regard the government may not keep 
as unconstitutional - ·or at corporations or unions from 
least constitutionally problem- spending money to support or 
atic - many legislative re- denounce individual candi-
forms and judicial interven- dates in elections. Thus, the 
tions that might help to shore regulation of money in politics 
up our faltering democracy. is at present largely a consti-
Consider, for example, the tutional no-go zone. 
role of money in political cam- Or consider, for another ex-
paigns. Many believe that the ample, partisan gerrymander-
nation would be well served by ing- the widespread practice 
the enactment of experimen- of state legislatures redrawing 
tal laws authorizing the public the boundaries of federal and 
financing of elections, placing state legislative districts to 
tighter limits on campaign protect incumbents and to ad-
contributions, and requiring vance the interests of the · 
more transparency from the party that controls the legisla-
persons and interests that ture. With the 2020 census re-
fund politicians and political cently completed, we are 
organizations. about to embark on another 
But laws of this sort are, if round of redistricting across 
not outright unconstitutional, the nation. And we -can expect 
at least highly problematic un- , partisan gerrymandering to 
der interpretations of the First be rampant. 
Amendment that the Supreme There is broad agreement 
Court has adopted in recent among political scientists that 
decades. See, for example, partisan gerrymandering is 
- --- * 
playing a significant role in in-
creasing polarization, facilitat-
ing the emergence of extreme 
politicians, undermining the 
prospects for legislative com-
promise, and exacerbating 
distrust in the integrity and 
fairness of our electoral pro-
cesses. 
But the Supreme Court, 
while acknowledging that ex-
treme partisan gerrymander-
ing can undermine rights and 
values protected by the Con-
stitution, has held that held 
that the federal courts cannot 
order remedies for unconsti-
tutional partisan gerryman-
dering. See Rucho v. Common 
Cause (2019), another 5-4 de-
cision which held that parti-
san gerrymandering claims 
present political questions be-
yond the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 
Moreover, a majority of the 
Supreme Court harbors 
strong reservations about a 
practice adopted in a handful 
of states in order to address 
the problem of partisan gerry-




missions to redraw legislative 
boundaries. In Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Inde-
pendent Redistricting Com-
mission (2015), a slim 5-4 
court majority rejected an ar-
gument by the Arizona legisla-
ture that a state ballot initia-
tive creating an independent 
redistricting commission un-
constitutionally cut the legis-
lature out of the redistricting 
process. 
But there has been a signif-
icant shift in the Supreme 
Court's makeup since 2015, 
and some of the newer jus-
tices have expressed views 
about the state legislature's 
role in the electoral process 
that are more aligned with 
those of the Arizona Indepen-
dent Redistricting Committee 
dissent. Therefore, if the court 
revisits the issue, there is rea-
son to be concerned that the 
creation of independent redis-
tricting commissions by ballot 
initiative may no longer be a 
constitutional means of deal-
ing with the problem of parti-
san gerrymandering. 
Finally, consider as two fur-
a a a 
ther examples term limits and 
the presidential line-item veto. 
Many believe that the public 
interest would be well served 
by placing limits on the num-
ber of terms that members of 
Congress can serve, and by 
empowering the president to 
strike wasteful provisions of 
legislation enacted by 
Congress while still permit-
ting the remaining provisions 
to become law. 
But, here again, the 
Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Constitution to bar 
these reform efforts. See U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton 
(1995) , a 5-4 decision which 
held that states cannot impose 
qualifications for prospective 
members of Congress (such 
as term limits) that are 
stricter than those specified in 
the Constitution, and Clinton 
v. City of New York (1998), a 6-
3 decision which held that leg-
islation that passes both 
Houses of Congress must ei-
ther be entirely approved (i.e., 
signed) or rejected (i.e., ve-
toed) by the president. 
These cases may or may 
J 
not have been correctly de-
cided. But the number of dis-
senting justices in each of 
them strongly suggests that 
the constitutional issue de-
cided was not entirely clear. 
Our democracy clearly is in 
peril.So,perhapsthejustices 
should think long and hard be- . 
fore deciding that our ancient 
constitutional text - enacted 
at a time when so many were 
excluded from the full benefits 
of citizenship - should be read 
to prevent We the People of 
2021 from experimenting with 
measures that could help to 
save it? As Justice Robert 
Jackson once put it, the Con-
stitution was not intended to 
be a suicide pact. 
(John Greabe teaches con-
stitutional law and directs 
the Warren B. Rudman Cen-
ter for Justice, Leadership & 
Public Service at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire 
Franklin Pierce School of 
Law. The opinions he ex-
presses in his "Constitutional 
Connections" columns are 
entirely his own.) 
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